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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent e
v.
STEVEN TROY SPAN,
:

Case No. 890152
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code
Ann. section 78-2-2(3)(i) (Utah Supreme Court jurisdiction over
first degree felony convictions).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the trial court violate Appellant's
constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and an
impartial jury and his statutory right to a jury selection free
of racial discrimination by allowing the prosecutor's racially
motivated exercise of a peremptory challenge?
2. Should this Court allow prosecutors to disobey trial
court orders as long as there is sufficient evidence to translate
the misconduct into harmless error?
3. Was the evidence sufficient to support Appellant's
conviction?
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Pertinent statutory and constitutional provisions are
set forth in the addendum to this brief.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 16, 1989, a jury convicted Appellant of
aggravated arson, a first degree felony violation of Utah Code
Ann* section 76-6-103 (R. 55).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. THE FIRE STARTED WHILE APPELLANT WAS AT HOME WITH HIS FATHER.
On November 16, 1988, between 3:12 and 3:20 a.m.. Brent
Van Os and Curt Taylor drove past the 2800 South Adams apartment
complex and noticed a fire in a second story apartment (T. 136137, 150). The fire department received a call about the fire at
3:32 a.m. (T. 89). One of the firemen estimated that it took the
team approximately five minutes to arrive at the scene of the
fire (T. 90, 95). Fire investigator David Meldrum concluded that
the fire had burned for a total of fifteen or twenty minutes
before the fire department arrived (T. 272).
Appellant's father, Alvin Span, testified that on
November 16, 1988, he was at home with his son from 1:00 a.m.
until 3:15 a.m., when Appellant left in his car to move to Nevada
(To 442-447).

Mr. Span saw no fire accelerants in Appellant's

possession that night (T. 447).
B. THE CONDITION OF THE APARTMENT INDICATED SEVERAL POSSIBLE
SOURCES OF THE FIRE, AND NONE OF THE EVIDENCE POINTED
CONCLUSIVELY TO ARSON.
As is discussed in detail in Point III of this brief,
the fire investigation in this case was incomplete and
inconclusive.

There were no accelerant containers or other arson

tools found at the scene of the fire (T. 198). There was
2

conflicting testimony about whether there were pour patterns, and
no testimony that any patterns in the apartment indicated
intentional burning (T. 201-202, 283, 285)*

There were numerous

possible natural sources of the fire, and many of these were not
investigated (T. 111-114, 117, 120-122, 171-172, 192-193, 196,
198-200, 292, 366). There were no signs of forced entry into the
burned apartment to which Appellant had no access (T. 100, 239,
204)•

A man and woman were seen near the fire (T. 218).

C. THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN APPELLANT AND THE ARSON VICTIM DO NOT
SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT APPELLANT STARTED THE FIRE.
The second story apartment that burned was rented to
Barbara Lee, the mother of Appellant's child, Falcon (T. 308310).

At the time of the fire, Ms. Lee worked as a cocktail

waitress in a topless bar, the Barbed Wire, located at 348 West
500 South in Salt Lake City (T. 311). She worked every night
from 6:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m., while Appellant watched Falcon (T.
311, 368). Ms. Lee frequently had problems with male patrons at
work (T. 371 J.1
Ms. Lee rented the new apartment after she and
Appellant broke up around November 7, 1988 (T. 309-310).

Their

decision to break up their four year relationship was mutual, and
they went shopping for new apartments together (T. 461). During

1
Ms. Lee seemed to be having difficulties with other
people during this time. In September of 1988, Ms. Lee's next
door neighbor, Ronda, punched Ms. Lee in the eye because Ronda
thought Ms. Lee had reported Ronda's welfare fraud (T. 369-370).
Ronda also followed Ms. Lee around when they were in their cars
(T. 373). Ms. Lee claimed that Ronda moved to Idaho prior to
the fire (T. 373).
3

the course of their breakup, Appellant damaged Ms. Lee's car
windshield twice, once because she threatened to stop him from
seeing his daughter and once because she left before Appellant
was finished speaking with her (T. 336-337, 344-346)•
On November 16, Ms. Lee spent the day with Appellant,
their daughter, Falcon, and Appellant's father (T. 312-313).
Appellant and his father were smoking cigarettes in Ms. Lee's
apartment on November 16, 1988 (T. 366).
That night, after Ms. Lee went to work, Appellant came
into the Wire (the bar in the basement of the Elarbed Wire)
between 7s30 and 8s00 (T. 318). He asked Ms. Lee if she had any
money and asked her to buy him a drink (T. 319). She gave him
five dollars and bought him a drink (T. 319). He sat and watched
Ms. Lee for about an hour and then left (T. 320).
Randy Brown, a steady customer at the Wire, who had
helped Ms. Lee move her belongings into her new apartment, was
also at the Wire that night (T. 318). When Mr. Brown left the
Wire to go to his truck, Ms. Lee accompanied him outside, and
they discovered that his truck had been vandalized (T. 321). Mr.
Brown did not look to see if other cars in the Barbed Wire
parking lot had been vandalized (T. 380).
Twenty minutes after he left the Wire, Appellant called
Ms. Lee (T. 320). Ms. Lee accused Appellant of vandalizing Mr.
Brown's car, which accusation he denied (T. 323)*

About fifteen

minutes later, Appellant returned to the Wire (T. 323). When he
arrived, he sat next to Mr. Brown and spoke with him for about
4

fifteen minutes (T. 326)*

Mr. Brown testified that Appellant

asked him if he was Ms. Lee's new boyfriend, and they discussed
whether or not Appellant had vandalized Mr. Brown's truck (T.
382).

At about 11:00, Appellant went to the parking lot, where

he apparently remained until closing at 1:00, at which time he
came into the Wire again, but was told the bar was closing (T.
327).

The Wire staff left together and went to Denny's, and Mr.

Brown went there with Ms. Lee in her car (T. 328). Ms. Lee
stayed with Mr. Brown that night, and found out by calling her
father the next morning that her apartment had burned (T. 331333).
After leaving the Wire, Appellant went home to talk
with his father, and decided to move to Nevada (T. 442-447).
They were together until about 3:15 a.m., at which time the elder
Mr. Span left on a truck driving job and Appellant drove off with
his car packed to go to Nevada (T. 442-447).
Appellant testified that after leaving his father, he
stopped at a gas station and then drove to Ms. Lee's apartment to
tell her that in moving back to Las Vegas, he didn't intend to
abandon his rights as a father to Falcon, but when he saw the
fire, he drove away in a panic (T. 472). He drove to Karen
Bateman's apartment (Ms. Bateman was, both before and after the
fire, a friend of both Ms. Lee and Appellant) to tell her about
how he felt about Ms. Lee's conduct, and that he was moving to
Las Vegas (T. 393-395).

At trial, Ms. Bateman testified that

Appellant told her that Ms. Lee's apartment was in flames (T.
5

395-399).
While Appellant was in Nevada, Ms. Lee continued to
interact with him, and he gave her furniture and other items
during that time period (T. 408).
Appellant testified at trial that he did not set Ms.
Lee's apartment on fire (T. 477).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Before the jurors were sworn, Appellant moved to quash
the jury, alleging that the prosecutor had used a peremptory
challenge to remove the only racial minority panel member (T.
62).

The court denied this motion, concluding that Appellant was

not timely in raising it, and concluding that Appellant had not
proven himself a member of a "cognizable racial group" (T. 65,
69).
Because Appellant raised his objection to the
peremptory challenge at the first opportunity outside the
presence of the jury and before the jurors were sworn, it was
timely under Utah law.

Under state and federal constitutional

provisions relating to equal protection of the laws, due process
2
The morning after Ms. Bateman's conversation with
Appellant, she was interviewed by fire investigator Brown, who
indicated that Ms. Bateman had recited Appellant's previous
threats to blow up Ms. Lee's car and burn up her apartment and
her father's house, and Ms. Bateman quoted Appellant as having
said "I flamed Barbara's apartment." (T. 426).
Ms. Bateman explained at trial that she was unsure of
what Appellant had said on the night of the fire because she was
drunk that night, adding that regardless of what Appellant said,
Ms. Bateman did not think Appellant was responsible for the fire
(T. 395, 399). During the interview between Mr. Brown and Ms.
Bateman, Ms. Lee was present and repeatedly interrupted and
interjected comments (T. 427-428).
6

of law, and fair trial, and under state and federal jury
selection laws, Appellant's race does not preclude him from
objecting to the prosecutor's exercise of a peremptory challenge
on the basis of race.
During the State's case-in-chief, Appellant moved to
prohibit the prosecution from eliciting evidence concerning arson
suspects other than Appellant (T. 414-415).

Immediately after

this motion was granted, the prosecutor elicited the forbidden
evidence from the State's witness (T. 414). Appellant moved for
a mistrial, which the court denied (T. 415-417).
While the prosecutor's disobedience of the trial
court's order constitutes reversible error under conventional
prosecutorial misconduct cases, Appellant asks this Court to
adopt a standard of automatic reversal in cases such as the
instant one involving blatant disobedience of the trial court by
the prosecutor.
The evidence in this case does not demonstrate that the
fire in Ms. Lee's apartment was caused by arson or by Appellant.
Because the State failed to sustain its burden of proving
Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court should
reverse Appellant's conviction and declare him innocent as a
matter of law.
I.
THE COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S STATE AND FEDERAL
RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND
A FAIR TRIAL, AND STATE AND FEDERAL
JURY SELECTION LAWS BY ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR'S
RACIALLY MOTIVATED EXERCISE OF
A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE.

7

A. THE PROSECUTOR, USING A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE, REMOVED THE ONLY
NON-CAUCASIAN FROM THE JURY,
Before Appellant's jury was sworn, Appellant moved to
quash the jury, alleging that the prosecutor had used his last
peremptory challenge to remove the only racial minority member
(T. 62). The court denied this motion without evaluating the
merits of the claim, concluding that Appellant was not timely in
raising it, and concluding that Appellant had not proven himself
a member of a "cognizable racial group" (T. 65, 69). The
transcript pages covering this issue are included in Appendix 1.
B. APPELLANT'S MOTION TO QUASH THE JURY WAS TIMELY.
After the court's initial indication that Appellant's
motion to quash the jury came too late, defense counsel
explained that her objection followed the removal of Mr. Phung by
minutes, that the challenge removing Mr. Phung was the
prosecution's last, and that defense counsel had objected to that
challenge at the first opportunity outside the presence of the
jury, before they had been sworn (T. 67).
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-16, which governs
challenges to jury selection, provides the following time limits
for such challenges:
(1) Within seven days after the moving
party discovered, or by the exercise of
diligence could have discovered the grounds
therefore, and in any event before the trial
jury is sworn to try the case, a party may
move to stay the proceedings or to quash an
indictment, or for other appropriate relief,
on the ground of substantial failure to
comply with this act in selecting a grand or

8

trial jury.^
• o • •

This rule is also applied to evaluate the timeliness of
constitutional jury selection challenges.^

Utah Rule of

Criminal Procedure 18(c)(ii) also provides that challenges to
panels are timely if raised prior to the swearing in of the
jurors.
Because Appellant objected to the jury selection
process within minutes of the prosecutor8s peremptory challenge
of Mr. Phung, and before the jury was sworn (T. 69), the
objection was timely under Utah law.
C. APPELLANT'S RACE DOES NOT PROTECT THE PROSECUTOR'S ABUSE OF
THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE FROM SCRUTINY.
The trial court refused to consider Appellant's
3
The Utah Jury Selection Act contains two provisions
concerning Appellant's racial discrimination objection. Utah
Code Ann. section 76-46-3 provides:
A citizen shall not be excluded or
exempt from jury service on account of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or
economic status.
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-2 provides:
It is the policy of this state that
persons selected for jury service be selected
at random from a fair cross section of the
population of the area served by the court,
and that all qualified citizens have the
opportunity in accordance with this act to be
considered for jury service and have the
obligation to serve as jurors when summoned
for that purpose.
4
See State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah
1986)(defendant*s challenge to the constitutionality of the jury
selection in her case was waived because it was not raised in the
trial court before the jury was sworn, as required by section 7646-16(1)).
9

allegation that the prosecutor removed Mr. Phung for racial
purposes because Appellant, as a Caucasian (T. 68), was not a
member of a "cognizable racial group" (T. 65)»

It is true that

the cases named specifically during the motion to quash the jury
pose as an element of a prima facie case of racial
discrimination a showing that the appellant and the jurors
stricken by the peremptory challenges share membership in a
cognizable racial group.^
However, defense counsel argued that the showing of
racial identity between a criminal defendant and a juror removed
by peremptory challenge is not a mandatory showing, and argued
that other cases recognize that an appellant may object to the
improper exercise of peremptory challenge by the prosecutor,
regardless of the race of the appellant (T. 67).
As is discussed infra, Appellant's rights to equal
protection, due process, and to a fair trial under the Utah and
United States Constitutions, and his rights under the Utah and
United States jury selection laws are not contingent on his race.
1. EQUAL PROTECTION
a. Federal Equal Protection
In State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988), this Court
explained the prima facie showing a defendant must make in order
to raise a challenge under Batson v* Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986):
To attack a peremptory challenge under
5

Cantu, 750 P.2d at 595; Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
10

Batson, the defendant must establish a prima
facie case by showing (1) that he is a member
of a cognizable racial group, (2) that the
prosecution exercised peremptory challenges
to remove from the panel members of the
defendant's race, and (3) that all the
relevant facts and circumstances raise an
inference that the prosecution used its
peremptory challenges to exclude the
veniremen from the petit jury on account of
their race.
Id, at 595.
Inasmuch as the defendant in Cantu was apparently of
6
the same racial origin as the juror stricken, this Court was not
in a position in that case to evaluate whether or not the racial
identity factor set forth in Batson is a prerequisite to raising
the claim, or merely one mode of proof of racial discrimination.
Appellant urges this Court to examine the analysis
provided by State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 753 P.2d

6
The defendant in Cantu was able to meet the first two
prongs of the Batson test because he was hispanic and the juror
stricken was
one of two people with Hispanic surnames
picked to supplement the jury venire.
Although the challenged panel member, Mr.
Lopez, was a native-born American and did not
respond when the panel was asked if any of
them considered themselves a member of a
minority group, he did concede that he was of
Hispanic ancestry.
....

When asked if he considered himself a member
of a minority group, Lopez, a native born
American, indicated that he did not. Only
when pressed on the point did he concede that
his ancestry was Hispanic. There is no
indication on the record that Lopez appeared
Hispanic or spoke with an accent.
Id. at 596, 597.
11

1168 (Ariz.App.), affirmed, 760 P.2d 541 (Ariz.), U»S. appeal
pending, and to recognize that the racial identity factor is not
a prerequisite to raising a claim of racial discrimination under
Batson.
In State v. Superior Court (Maricopa County), 753 P.2d
1168 (Ariz. App.), affirmed, 760 P.2d 541 (Ariz.)# U.S. appeal
pending, the court explored a white defendant's Batson challenge
to peremptory challenge removal of two black veniremen.
1169.

Id^ at

Upon the defendant's objection during jiary selection, the

trial court requested the prosecution to explain the exercise of
peremptory challenges removing the two black jurors*

_Id.

The

State refused to comply with the trial court's request, and
sought special relief from the appellate court, arguing that
because the defendant was white and the challenged jurors were
black, the defendant had no standing and could not make a prima
facie showing under Batson.

Id. at 1169-1170.

The appellate court rejected the State's reasoning,
explaining that
[w]hatever his race, a criminal defendant has
standing to challenge the system used to
select his grand or petit jury, on the ground
that it arbitrarily excludes from service the
members of any race, and thereby denies him
due process of law.
Id. at 1170-1171, quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, at 504
(1972).

The Court explained federal caselaw showing that the

racial identity requirement in Batson is neither a standing
7
Peters v. Kiff is discussed in detail in subsection 2
of subsection B of this point.
12

requirement, nor an essential element to every prima facie case,
but is merely one factor among many that might be used to raise
an inference of racial discrimination.

See .id. at 1170-1172.

The court concluded that the trial court was acting within its
discretion in ordering the State to explain the peremptory
challenges of the two black jurors, ^Ed. at 1172.
b. State Uniform Operation of Laws
Regardless of this Court's acceptance of the
interpretation of federal standards espoused by the Arizona
appellate court in the Maricopa County case, Appellant notes that
this Court has yet to define how the Utah State Constitution
uniform operation of laws provision applies to claims of racial
discrimination in jury selection.
Article I section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides:
All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.
In Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), this Court
explained that while federal precedents interpreting the federal
equal protection clause may be persuasive in the interpretation
of the state constitutional uniform operation of laws provision,
they are not binding - this Court is free to adopt
interpretations of the Utah uniform operations of laws provision
that provide greater protection than that provided by federal
interpretations of the federal equal protection clause.

^M. at

670.
In Malan v. Lewis, this Court recognised that uniform
operation of the laws is an essential check on the exercise of
13

government power.

IcJ. at 670.

Erecting a "same race" rule for

challenges of racist exercises of peremptory challenges can
hardly be expected to serve as a check on the exercise of
government power.

Indeed, the erection of such a rule would

facilitate the arbitrary exercise of government power, by
allowing even the most blatant cases of racial discrimination to
stand unexamined, as long as those cases involve the right racial
components (racial disparity between defendant and jurors).
In Peters v. Kiff, in explaining why racial
discrimination against black jurors deprives a white defendant of
due process of law under the federal constitution, Justices
Marshall, Douglas, and Stewart explained the harms caused by
racial jury selection,8
When any large and identifiable segment of
the community is excluded from jury service,
the effect is to remove from the jury room
qualities of human nature and varieties of
human experience, the range of which is
unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not
necessary to assume that the excluded group
will consistently vote as a class in order to
conclude, as we do, that their exclusion
deprives the jury of a perspective on human
events that my have unsuspected importance in
any case that may be presented.
8
Justices Marshall, Douglas, and Stewart found that due
process forbids racist jury selection, regardless of the race of
the criminal defendant. Peters at 494-505. Justices White,
Brennan, and Powell concurred in the judgment expressed in the
main opinion, noting that federal laws prohibiting racist jury
selection reflect the central concern of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and should be read as granting standing to the
petitioner in Peters. Id. at 505-507. Justices Burger, Blackmun
and Rehnquist dissented, arguing that there was no proof of a
causal connection between the denial of the petitioner's
constitutional rights and his conviction, and noting that the
issue was not timely raised. jEd. at 507-513.
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Id. at 503-504.
The main opinion noted that when racial considerations
control jury selection, harms run to the defendant in the case
where the discrimination takes place, to all criminal defendants
who are deprived by corrupt jury selection systems of a fair
cross-section of the community on their juries, and to the
excluded jurors, who are denied their right to participate in the
justice system and who are stigmatized as a class as being people
of lesser quality than those who are allowed to sit on juries.
9
Id. at 499-500.
Appellant urges this Court to protect him, other
criminal defendants, and all potential jurors from racial
discrimination in the jury selection process by interpreting
Article I section 24 of the Utah Constitution as requiring the
state to provide a racially neutral explanation for peremptory
challenges when the trial court finds that the facts and
circumstances of the case raise an inference of racial
discrimination.

See State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County,

753 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Ariz.App.), affirmed, 760 P.2d 541 (Ariz.),
U.S. appeal pending, (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 9697, "In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite
showing, the trial court should consider all relevant
circumstances.").
2. DUE PROCESS
9
See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86-88 (1986)
(discussing harms of racial discrimination in jury selection).
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a. Federal Due Process
Federal due process forbids racial jury selection,
regardless of the race of the defendant on trial.

As stated in

Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), in the opinion of Justices
Marshall, Douglas, and Stewart,
The crime, and the unconstitutional state
action, occur whether the defendant is white
or Negro, whether he is acquitted or
convicted. In short, when a grand or petit
jury has been selected on an impermissible
basis, the existence of a constitutional
violation does not depend on the
circumstances of the person making the claim.
Id. at 498.
In Peters, the petitioner, a white male who had been
convicted of burglary in state court, argued for the first time
in a federal habeas corpus following the affirmance of his
conviction by the state appellate court that the juries that
indicted and convicted him were comprised illegally, as a result
of systematic exclusion of blacks from jury service.
495, and n. 1, 3.

Ld. at 494-

The state argued that because the petitioner

was white, he had suffered no discrimination, but six members of
the Supreme Court rejected the state's argument.
The main opinion explains how due process governs jury
selection and protects against racist jury selection practices:
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process."...
[It is] well established that the Due Process
Clause protects a defendant from jurors who
are actually incapable of rendering an
impartial verdict, based on the evidence and
the law....
Moreover, even if there is no showing
of actual bias in the tribunal, this Court
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has held that due process is denied by
circumstances that create the likelihood or
the appearance of bias....
These principles compel the conclusion
that a State cannot, consistent with due
process, subject a defendant to indictment or
trial by a jury that has been selected in an
arbitrary and discriminatory manner, in
violation of the Constitution and laws of the
United States. Illegal and unconstitutional
jury selection procedures cast doubt on the
integrity of the whole judicial process.
They create the appearance of bias in the
decision of individual cases, and they
increase the risk of actual bias as well.
Id. at 501-503 (citations omitted).
As is discussed in subpoint D, it appears that the
prosecutor challenged Mr. Phung because of his race.

In allowing

the prosecutor in the instant case to remove Mr. Phung from the
jury because of his race, the trial court violated Appellant's
federal right to due process,
b. State Due Process
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law."

In interpreting this provision of

the Utah Constitution, this Court has described as persuasive
federal precedents interpreting the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

E.g.

Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v. Industrial Commission, 649 P.2d
33 (Utah 1982).

Appellant urges this Court to adopt the

reasoning and result of Peters v. Kiff in interpreting Article I
section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
As will be shown in subsection D of this point,
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Appellant was tried and convicted by a jury selected in an
arbitrary and discriminatory manner.

Regardless of Appellant's

race, in allowing the prosecutor to exercise his peremptory
challenge of Mr. Phung in a discriminatory manner, the court
jeopardized the deliberative process of Appellant's trial,
violated Mr. Phung's right to serve on the jury, sacrificed the
integrity of the judicial process, and violated Appellant's right
to due process under the Utah Constitution.

See Peters v. Kiff,

407 U.S. 493, 498-503 (1972).
3. TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY
a. Federal Right to a Fair Trial
A prosecutor's racist exercise of peremptory challenges
violates an appellant's federal right to a fair trial, regardless
of the race of the appellant.

In Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762

(6th Cir.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987), the court
determined that the systematic racist exclusion of jurors through
the exercise of peremptory challenges violates the federal
constitutional Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury,
statings
Such an abuse distorts the jury's decisionmaking, undermines the jury's integrity, and
denies both the defendant and the public the
impartial jury that the Constitution
requires.
Id. at 762.
In Booker, two black defendants were convicted by an
all-white jury of armed robbery.

Icl. at 763-764.

The jury

selection involved multiple racially based peremptory challenges
18

Id. at 764.

Both the trial court and the federal magistrate

reviewing the voir dire in habeas corpus proceedings concluded
that there was no precedent for prohibiting the use of peremptory
challenges for racist purposes.

Ici. at 764-765.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit provided a review of Sixth
Amendment law pertaining to jury selection, see 775 F.2d 762,
767-770, and concluded that the amendment prohibits the racist
exercise of peremptory challenges:
We conclude that a prosecutor's
systematic use of peremptory challenges to
excuse members of a cognizable group from a
criminal petit jury offends the Sixth
Amendment's protection of the defendant's
interest in a fair trial and the public's
interest in the integrity of judicial
process, as well as the prosecutor's special
duty as "the servant of the law" to see that
"guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer."
Id* at 772 (citations omitted).

The Sixth Amendment analysis

provided by the Sixth Circuit was in no way contingent on the
race of the appellant.

The Court recognized that racist exercise

of peremptory challenges, by limiting the representation on the
jury of a fair cross section of the community, impairs the
process of deliberation and destroys public confidence in the
integrity of the judicial process.

_Id. at 770-771.

As will be demonstrated in subsection D of this point,
the record in this case raises the inference that was not
rebutted that the prosecutor removed Mr. Phung with a peremptory
challenge for racist purposes.

In allowing the prosecutor's

peremptory challenge of Mr. Phung to stand, the trial court
violated Appellant's right to an impartial jury under the Sixth
19

Amendment to the United States Constitution,
b. State Right to an Impartial Jury.
Article I section 12 provides, in part, "In criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed."
Aside from following federal interpretations of the
federal guarantee of an impartial jury, this Court should decide
as a matter of state constitutional law that Article I section 12
of the Utah Constitution prohibits arbitrary and discriminatory
jury selection such as that occurring in this case.
Appellant refers this Court to state court decisions
interpreting state constitutional provisions designed to insure
impartial juries through representation of fair cross sections of
the community on juries, which decisions have concluded that the
racist use of peremptory challenges is impermissible under state
constitutional provisions, regardless of the race of the
appellant. ^

This Court has already relied on some of these

cases in evaluating racial discrimination in the exercise of a
peremptory challenge.

Appellant requests that this Court adopt

a specific interpretation of the Utah Constitution impartial jury
10
See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978); State
v. Neil, 487 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Com, v. Spares, 387 N.E.2d
499 (Mass.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Crespin,
612 P.2d 716 (N.M. 1980).
11
See State v. Cantu, 114 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah
1989), which cites and discusses State v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748
(Cal. 1978); State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Tla.)# cert,
denied, 108 S.Ct. 2873 (1988).
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provision, which prohibits racial exercises of peremptory
challenges.
4. UTAH AND UNITED STATES JURY SELECTION LAWS
a* Federal Jury Selection Law
Appellant is entitled under federal law to challenge
racial discrimination in the selection of his jury, regardless
of his race.

In Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), Justices

Marshall, Douglas, and Stewart concluded that standing of the
petitioner to object to the racist jury selection involved in
that case was assured by 18 U.S.C. section 243, which provides:
No citizen possessing all other
qualifications which are or may be prescribed
by law shall be disqualified for service as
grand or petit juror in any court of the
United States, or of any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of
servitude...
Id. at 504-505.

This statute was also mentioned as a basis for

the petitioner's standing by concurring justices White, Brennan,
and Powell.

Id. at 505-507.

b. State Jury Selection Laws
The policy governing jury selection in Utah is
expressed in Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-2:
It is the policy of this state that
persons selected for jury service be selected
at random from a fair cross section of the
population of the area served by the court,
and that all qualified citizens have the
opportunity in accordance with this act to be
considered for jury service and have the
obligation to serve as jurors when summoned
for that purpose.
More specifically, Utah Code Ann. section 76-46-3 prohibits
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racial discrimination in jury selection in all cases, regardless
of the race of the litigants:
A citizen shall not be excluded or
exempt from jury service on account of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or
economic status•
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-16, which governs claims
under the Utah Jury Selection Act, poses as a prerequisite to
correction of violations under the act a finding of actual
prejudice.

As explained in the main opinion in Peters v. Kiff,

the dangers posed by racist jury selection, while difficult to
prove, are of such gravity that prejudice is effectively presumed
in these cases.

See id. at 504.

In denying Appellant the benefits due him under state
and federal jury selection laws because of Appellant's race, the
trial court violated the state and federal jury selection laws,
and this error should be presumed prejudicial.
D. THE RECORD OF THE VOIR DIRE DEMONSTRATES THAT THE PROSECUTOR
EXERCISED HIS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE OF MR. PHUNG IN A RACIALLY
DISCRIMINATORY MANNER.
In State v. Cantu, 114 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1989),
this Court vacated the appellant's conviction cifter finding that
the prosecutor's exercise of a peremptory challenge was indirectly motivated by race.

Id^. at 4.

While the claim of improper

exercise of peremptory challenge was originally raised under
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) as a federal equal
protection case, after remand, this Court referred to State v.
Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978), a case decided under a state
constitutional fair trial provision, for the elements of a prima
22

facie case of racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory
challenges s
California courts, for example, require
that the issue of group-biased peremptory
challenges be raised in a timely manner and
that the complaining party make a prima facie
case of bias. The elements necessary to
such a prima facie case include (1) as
complete a record as possible, (2) a showing
that persons excluded belong to a cognizable
group under the representative cross-section
rule, and (3) a showing that there exists "a
strong likelihood that such persons are being
challenged because of their group association
rather than because of any specific bias."
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 280, 281, 148
Cal. Rptr. 890, 905, 583 P.2d 748, 764
(1978).
Cantu at 4.
This court quoted a case from Florida, another
jurisdiction which decides cases of racially motivated peremptory
challenges under the state constitution fair trial provision, 12
in explaining the factors to be considered in evaluating the
state's racially neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges
"We agree that the presence of one or
more of these factors will tend to show that
the state's reasons are not actually
supported by the record or are an
impermissible pretext: (1) alleged group bias
not shown to be shared by the juror in
question, (2) failure to examine the juror or
perfunctory examination, assuming neither the
trial court nor opposing counsel had
12
See State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1984)(the
controlling opinion cited in Slappy v. State, 503 So.2d 350
(Fla.App.3 Dist. 1987); and State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.
1988); which opinion provides that racist peremptory challenges
violate the state constitutional provision concerning impartial
jurors).
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questioned the juror, (3) singling the juror
out for special questioning designed to evoke
a certain response, (4) the prosecutor's
reason is unrelated to the facts of the case,
and (5) a challenge based on reasons equally
applicable to juror [sic] not challenged."
State v, Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla.
1988)[cert, denied, cert, denied,
108 S.Ct.
2873 (1988)]..•
Id.
In Cantu, this Court did not apply these tests element
by element, but apparently surveyed all the relevant facts and
concluded that the defendant had made a prima facie showing of
discriminatory peremptory challenge, which the prosecution failed
to rebuts
In the transcript of the proceedings
below, the prosecutor asked no questions
during the initial voir dire examination, and
when the supplemental jurors were introduced,
the prosecutor asked only one question before
exercising his first and only peremptory
challenge of the entire voir dire process.
The question was both desultory and insufficient to establish any specific bias on the
part of the jurors. "I don't know if you
asked this, Judge. I would ask you to
inquire of either of these two folks whether
or not any of their friends or families have
been similarly charged. I don't know if you
did."
The facts and circumstances of the instant case both
raise the inference that the prosecutor challenged Mr. Phung
because of Mr. Phung's race, and indicate that the prosecutor's
explanation of the challenge fails to rebut the inference.^3
13
See State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 596 (Utah 1988)("In
applying Batson, we will examine the record to determine if all
the 'facts and circumstances' raise the inference that the
prosecution used its peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner. While we recognize that the trial court
24

The entire examination of Mr. Phung proceeded as
follows
My name is Viet Phung. My wife's name is
Tontee Wen (phonetic). We living at 2332
West between 3332 West and Hope Lane. And I
work for a supermarket, Dan's. My wife work
for American Express Corporation. I'm been
in the — the first time I've been in court.
I have a three children: 18, 15, and 9. And
I graduate from high school in Viet Nam.
THE COURT: How long have you been a
citizen?
MR. PHUNG: I've been a citizen for
about, let's see, nine years.
THE COURT: This is your first experience
in court?
MR. PHUNG: Yes.
(T. 19).
The examination revealed no inability of Mr. Phung to
serve as an unbiased juror, and the prosecutor made no effort to
delve further into Mr. Phung*s background or perspective.

The

prosecutor's only contribution to the voir dire was asking the
court to ask all of the jurors about their ability to evaluate
testimony from police officers and their ability to evaluate
circumstantial evidence (T. 35-36), and asking juror Damewood
about how his employment by the sheriff's office would influence
his performance as a juror (T. 44-45).
Most of the characteristics revealed about Mr. Phung
were shared by most of the jurors, and the characteristics of the
other jurors stricken by the prosecutor do not reflect a

may be in a better position to make that determination initially,
an evidentiary hearing held after remand could not recreate all
the 'facts and circumstances' as they existed at the time the
challenge was made.")
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correlation between Mr. Phung's characteristics (unrelated to his
race) and the prosecutor's exercise of the other three peremptory
challenges.
14
The state's other peremptory challenges struck Ivan
Wright, Carleen Hatch and Robin Oliver (R. 56-57).
Nineteen of the twenty other jurors had been married,
and one of the jurors stricken by the state was not married*
Married jurors: Collette Stone (T. 13); Cheryl Andrews (T. 14);
Joyce Bishop (T. 15); Linda Miller (T. 17); Robin Oliver (T. 18);
Michael Brown (T. 20); Keo Sorenson (T. 22); James Allfrey (T.
23); Jennifer Stout (T. 23); Suzanne Parkin (T. 24); Idonna
Babcock (T. 25); Carleen Hatch (T. 25); Marion Pettey (T. 26);
Robert Curtis (T. 27); Robert Damewood (T. 28); Joyce Kirkham (T.
29); Thomas Cain (T. 30); Janet Fristrup (T. 31); George Young
(T. 31).
At least seventeen of the twenty other jurors had
children, and one of the jurors stricken by the state had no
children. Parent jurors: Collette Stone (T. 13); Cheryl Andrews
(T. 15); Joyce Bishop (T. 16); Linda Miller (T. 17); Robin Oliver
(T. 18); Michael Brown (T. 20); Keo Sorenson (T. 22); James
Allfrey (T. 23); Jennifer Stout (T. 23); Suzanne Parkin (T. 24);
Idonna Babcock (T. 25); Carleen Hatch (T. 26); Marion Pettey (T.
27); Robert Curtis (T. 27); Robert Damewood (T. 28); Joyce
Kirkham (T. 29); Janet Fristrup (T. 31). George Young was not
asked if he had children (T. 31).
Eighteen of the twenty other jurors were employed. Only
Jennifer Stout (T. 23) and Idonna Babcock (T. 25) were not
employed.
Fourteen of the twenty other jurors had spouses
employed outside the home, and two of the jurors stricken by the
state did not have a spouse working outside the home. Jurors
with spouses employed outside the home: Collette Stone (T. 13);
Cheryl Andrews (T. 14); Joyce Bishop (15); Linda Miller (T. 17);
Robin Oliver (T. 19); Michael Brown (T. 20); Keo Sorenson (T.
22); James Allfrey (T. 23); Jennifer Stout (T. 23); Suzanne
Parkin (T. 24); Idonna Babcock (T. 25); Thomas Cain (T. 31);
Janet Fristrup (T. 31); George Young (T. 31).
Thirteen of the twenty other jurors had no prior court
experience. Inexperienced jurors: Collette Stone (T. 114);
Cheryl Andrews (T. 15); Linda Miller (T. 18); Robin Oliver (T
.18); Keo Sorenson (T. 22); Jennifer Stout (T. 24); Idonna
Babcock (T. 25); Carleen Hatch (T. 26); Marion Pettey (T. 27);
Robert Curtis (T. 27); Ivan Wright (T. 28); Thomas Cain (T. 31);
Janet Fristrup (T. 31).
Seven of the twenty other jurors were high school
graduates, three of them did not complete high school, four of
them had graduated from college, four of them had some education
beyond high school, and two jurors' levels of education were not
26

These facts constitute a prima facie showing that the
prosecutor's exercise of the peremptory challenge of Mr. Phung
was racially discriminatory.
In Cantu, this Court explained that once such a prima
facie case is made, the prosecutor must provide a race-neutral
reason to justify to the peremptory challenge, which relates to
the juror or the case.

Ic[. at 4.

In this case, the prosecutor

offered only a general explanation of his methods of exercising
peremptory challenges, which neither related to Mr. Phung or to
this case.

See Appendix 1 (T. 63-65).

Because the prosecutor's explanation for removing Mr.
Phung with a peremptory challenge was not specific to the case or
to Mr. Phung, it failed to rebut Appellant's prima facie showing
that the peremptory challenge was exercised in a racially
discriminatory manner.

Appellant is entitled to a new trial.

Cantu at 4.
This Court may conclude that the trial court's mode of
disposing of Appellant's objection on the grounds of waiver and
discussed. High school graduates: Collette Stone (T. 14); Keo
Sorenson (T. 22); Jennifer Stout (T. 24); Suzanne Parkin (T. 25);
Idonna Babcock (T. 25); George Young (T. 31); Ivan Wright (T.
28). Less than high school education: Robin Oliver (T. 18);
Carleen Hatch (T. 26); Marion Pettey (T. 27). College graduates:
Linda Miller (T. 17); Michael Brown (T. 20); Robert Curtis (T.
27); Thomas Cain (T. 30). Some education beyond high school:
Cheryl Andrews (T. 14); Joyce Bishop (T. 15); Robert Damewood (T.
28); Janet Fristrup (T. 31). Education level not identified:
James Allfrey (T. 23); Joyce Kirkham (T. 29).
One of the other jurors, James Allfrey, worked for a
grocery store, and he was not stricken by the prosecutor (T. 23).
Mr. Phung was the only juror asked by the court to
disclose how long he had been a citizen of the United States (T.
19).
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lack of racial qualification to object, failed to afford the
prosecution an adequate opportunity to rebut the prima facie case
of racial discrimination.

In this event, this Court should

remand this case instructing the trial court that Appellant has
raised a prima facie case of racial discrimination, and ordering
the trial court to evaluate the prosecution's efforts at
rebutting the prima facie case.15
II.
THIS COURT SHOULD DETER INTENTIONAL
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
BY REVERSING APPELLANT'S CONVICTION WITHOUT
ENGAGING IN HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS.
A. THE PROSECUTOR INTRODUCED EVIDENCE PREVIOUSLY EXCLUDED BY THE
TRIAL COURT.
During the State's case in chief, the prosecutor
called Grant Hodson, the landlord over the apartment complex on
Adams and 28th (T. 411-412).

It was the prosecutor's intent to

show that Mr. Hodson had no motive to burn his own property (T.
412-413).

Defense counsel objected to this line of questioning,

the court sustained the objections, and held a bench conference
(T. 413). After the bench conference, the prosecutor continued
his direct examination of Mr. Hodson as follows:
Q. Have you suffered as a result of that
15
See State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah 1988)
(concurring opinion of Zimmerman, J., joined by Durham, J.)("On
remand, I would direct the trial court to consider the defendant
to have met his burden. Because neither Batson nor Griffith v.
Kentucky,
U.S.
, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987),
which made Batson retroactive, jLd. 107 S.Ct. at 710, 716, had
been decided at the time of the trial, the prosecutor should be
given an opportunity to rebut the inference. Once this is done,
the trial judge can proceed to rule on the question under
Batson.").
28

fire?
A. Excuse me, what?
Q. Yes or no, have you suffered as a
result of that fire?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you start the fire?
A. No.
MS. WELLSs Objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained. It may be
stricken. Your are to disregard it.
(T. 414).
Out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved
for a mistrial because the prosecutor had just violated the
court's bench conference ruling that the State not introduce
evidence as to whether or not Mr. Hodson started the fire (T.
414-415).

Despite the court's previous ruling prohibiting the

introduction of this evidence (the ruling was apparently based on
Rule of Evidence 403 (T. 417-418)), the court denied the motion
for a mistrial, concluding that striking the testimony was an
adequate remedy (T. 417). The transcript of this portion of the
trial is provided in Appendix 2.
By referring to Appendix 2, this Court can see that
initially, the prosecutor made no claim of misunderstanding the
court's bench ruling excluding the evidence.

Rather, the

prosecutor took issue with the ruling (T. 416-417).

The court

then indicated for the second time that the prosecutor had
violated the court's order, and the prosecutor apologized,
claiming for the first time that he had misunderstood the court's
order (T. 419).
B. THIS COURT SHOULD DETER INTENTIONAL PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
BY ORDERING A NEW TRIAL WITHOUT ENGAGING IN HARMLESS ERROR
ANALYSIS.
29

In State v. Ubaldi, 462 A.2d 1001 (Conn. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 916 (1983), the Connecticut Supreme Court,
reviewing similar prosecutorial disregard for trial court
rulings, created a new standard designed to deter such conducts
Where a prosecutor in argument interjects
remarks deliberately intended to undermine
the rulings of the trial court to the
prejudice of the defendant, his conduct is so
offensive to the sound administration of
justice that only a new trial can effectively
prevent such assaults on the integrity of the
tribunal.
Id. at 1011.
The court explained its refusal to apply a harmless
error analysis to the case;
The ultimate implication of this argument is
that a state's attorney may choose
deliberately to ignore any trial court ruling
just as long as the state has amassed
overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt
and the state's attorney's misconduct relates
only to a portion of that evidence. We
decline to place such a restraint on the
ability of this court to defend the integrity
of the judicial system.
Id. at 1007.
"*l*ie Ubaldi court recognized that the United States
Constitution does not mandate the reversal of a conviction unless
an appellant can demonstrate that prosecutorial misconduct
prejudiced his case, ]Ld. at 1007-1008, and proceeded to set the
reversal standard in cases of intentional prosecutorial
misconduct based on the court's supervisory authority over the
administration of justice.

Ic[. at 1008-1009.

The court recognized the remedies and rationales
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utilized in other states in cases of prosecutorial misconduct,
and explained why the court was not satisfied with those
remedies:
Some tribunals have declined to use such
supervisory power on the theory that society
should not bear the burden of a new trial
because of prosecutorial misconduct where a
new trial is not constitutionally mandated^
According to some authorities, the evil of
overzealous prosecutors is more appropriately
combatted through contempt sanctions,
disciplinary boards or other means. This
court, however, has long been of the view
that it is ultimately responsible for the
enforcement of court rules in prosecutorial
misconduct cases. Upsetting a criminal
conviction is a drastic step, but it is the
only feasible deterrent to flagrant
prosecutorial misconduct in defiance of a
trial court ruling.
Id. at 1009.
The court continued to explain why a meaningful
response from the court was essential:
We are mindful of the sage admonition that
appellate rebuke without reversal ignores the
reality of the adversary system of justice.
"The deprecatory words we use in our opinions
... are purely ceremonial.1 Government
16
See State v. Hodges, 517 P.2d 1322 (Utah 1974), a case
which did not involve intentional disobedience of a trial court
order, but involved asking an improper question, in which the
court stated,
Nevertheless, the processes of justice should
not be distorted simply for the purpose of
censuring a mistake. [Reminiscent of Justice
Cardozo's classic remark that: "a felon
should not go free because a constable has
blundered."] The critical inquiry should be
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
the incident so prejudiced the jury that in
its absence there might have been a different
result.
Id. at 1324 (bracketed portion footnoted in opinion).
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counsel, employing such tactics, are the kind
who, eager to win victories, will gladly pay
the small price of a ritualistic verbal
spanking. The practice [of verbal criticism
without judicial action] - recalling the
bitter tear shed by the Walrus as he ate the
oysters - breeds a deplorably cynical
attitude towards the judiciary*" Moreover,
"[d]eliberate prosecutorial misconduct is
presumably infrequent; to invalidate
convictions in the few cases where this is
proved, even on a fairly low showing of
materiality, will have a relatively small
impact on the desired finality of judgments
and will deter conduct undermining the
integrity of the judicial system."
Id. at 1009 (citations omitted, brackets by the court).
The court recognized that the exercise of its
supervisory powers in erecting the new rule first required
consideration of competing social values such as the trauma
imposed on the victim by reprosecution, and the ability of the
state to reprosecute.

id. at 1009.

The court found that the

victim, the city of Waterbury, would not be traumatized be a new
trial, and found that the rules of evidence would facilitate the
State's ability to retry the case.

Id.

Appellant requests this Court to exercise its
supervisory authority over the administration of the judicial
system to deter intentional prosecutorial misconduct such as that
which occurred in this case, by adopting a reversal standard like
that adopted by the Ubaldi court.
The victim in this case has had voluntary interactions
with Appellant since the fire (T. 370-371, 402, 476-477),
indicating that the potential trauma that might be imposed on her
by a new trial is limited.

Presumably, the Stcite would also be
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able to reprosecute the case.

While the costs which might be

imposed by a retrial of this case are significant the benefits
to be gained by this Court's enforcement of minimal standards of
prosecutorial conduct are essential to safeguarding the dignity
of the trial courts and the quality of criminal prosecutions.
This Court has previously addressed the standards of
performance which characterize prosecutors:
We have previously stated that the State
while charged with vigorously enforcing the
laws "has a duty to not only secure
appropriate convictions, but an even higher
duty to see that justice is done." In his
role as the State's representative in
criminal matters# the prosecutor, therefore,
must not only attempt to win cases, but must
see that justice is done. Thus, while he
should prosecute with earnestness and vigor,
it is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every
means to bring about a just one.
Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981).
The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct also indicate
that prosecutors are expected to conduct themselves in an ethical
and decorous manner.

Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8 provides,

"A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and
not simply that of an advocate."

Rule of Professional Conduct

3.4 provides in part, "A lawyer shall not ... (c) Knowingly
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an
open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exists;... (e) In trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer
does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be
supported by admissible evidence,...".
33

In introducing the excluded evidence in this case
immediately after the evidence was excluded, in arguing against
the court's ruling after introducing the evidence, and in
claiming as a last resort that he didn't understand the bench
ruling, the prosecutor failed to meet the basic standards of
prosecutorial conduct.
The application of harmless error analysis in this case
would effectively condone this kind of conduct in all cases in
which the prosecutor considers the evidence of guilt strong.
Such condonation would dilute the ethical quality of the role of
prosecutor and the power of the trial courts, and would render
the criminal trial process into bedlam . Appellant urges that
this Court's reversal of Appellant's conviction solely on the
basis of the prosecutor's blatant disregard of the trial court's
order will not only rectify the harm done to Appellant in this
case, but will also protect the order and dignity necessary for
the administration of justice in our jurisdiction.
Ce UNDER TRADITIONAL PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT ANALYSIS, THE TRIAL
COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL.
In the event that this Court declines to adopt an
automatic reversal standard in cases involving prosecutorial
disobedience of trial court orders, Appellant cisserts that under
traditional analysis, the trial court abused its discretion in
denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial based on the
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prosecutor's misconduct.17
In State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981),
apparently the only Utah case dealing with prosecutorial
disregard and disobedience of court orders, the prosecutor
repeatedly raised the appellant's failure to testify after the
trial court repeatedly sustained objections to the admission of
such evidence.

I_d. at 147.

After concluding that the

prosecutor's conduct violated the appellant's right to remain
silent, this Court found reversible error, stating:
The references to defendant's silence
are fundamental error, which could have
affected the result and are therefore
prejudicial.
Id. at 147 (citations omitted).
The standard for evaluating prosecutorial misconduct in
general prosecutorial misconduct cases appears to be more
stringent than that applied in Wiswell (a case distinguished from
the general cases by contumacious disobedience by the
prosecutor).

The general standard is described in State v.

Tucker, 727 P.2d 185 (Utah 1986):
This Court has adopted a two-part test
for determining whether a prosecutor's remark
warrants reversal: (1) did the remarks call
to the attention of the jurors matters which
they could not properly consider in
determining their verdict, and (2) were the
jurors under the circumstances of the
particular case probably influenced by those
remarks.

17
The standard of review of this issue is the abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Hodges, 517 P.2d 1322 (Utah 1974).
35

Id* at 187 (citations omitted, emphasis added)•
Appellant urges that the less stringent Wiswell
possible affect standard should apply in cases of intentional
disobedience by the prosecutor.-*-°

However, for purposes of

argument, Appellant is able to show under the more stringent
Tucker probable influence standard that reversal is appropriate
in this case.
1. THE PROSECUTOR CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THE JURORS A MATTER
WHICH THEY COULD NOT PROPERLY CONSIDER IN DETERMINING THEIR
VERDICT.
During the dispute surrounding the admission of the
excluded evidence, the court explained that the court chose to
exclude the evidence, apparently on the basis of Utah Rule of
Evidence 403 (T. 417-418 (Appendix 2)).19
The admission of evidence under Rule 403 is a matter
within the sound discretion of the trial court•
109 Utah AdVe Rep* 23, 25 (Utah 1989).

State v. Larson,

In choosing to elevate

the exercise of his own discretion over that of the trial court
by introducing the excluded evidence, the prosecutor called to
18
See State v. Walker, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah
1981)(applying a less stringent "could have affected" threshold
of prejudice to cases in which prosecutors knowingly use false
testimony or foster false impressions).
19

Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
36

the attention of the jurors a matter which they could not
properly consider in determining their verdict*
The court's decision to exclude the evidence concerning
the elimination of other possible suspects is further supported
by reference to State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986), in
which this Court explained the impropriety of trying to prove an
assertion through statistical probability evidence.™
20
In Rammel, a witness named Dyson testified under a
grant of immunity to his and the Appellant's involvement in a
robbery, jtd. at 499. When initially confronted about the crime,
Dyson denied any knowledge about or participation in the robbery,
but later confessed. _Id. at 499. The trial court admitted the
testimony of an Officer Welti, which indicated that most people
who eventually confess to the commission of crimes initially lie
to police officers about the crimes. I<3. at 500. Apparently,
the prosecution was attempting to show with this evidence that
Dyson's initial denial of involvement of the crime was normal,
and supported the credibility of his later confession. Id. at
500.
After discussing the impropriety of admitting this
testimony under evidentiary rules relating to impeachment of
witnesses and foundation for expert testimony, this Court
explained that the prosecution should not ask jurors to base
their conclusions in a specific case on evidence of probabilities
based on what happened in other cases, but should encourage
jurors to focus on the evidence pertinent to the specific case
before them. This Court stated:
Finally, even if the testimony was
proper impeachment evidence, it should have
been excluded because its potential for
prejudice substantially outweighed its
probative value. In this case, the
prosecution attempted to establish, in
effect, that there was a high statistical
probability that Dyson lied. Even where
statistically valid probability evidence has
been presented - and Welti's testimony hardly
qualifies as such - courts have routinely
excluded it when the evidence invites the
jury to focus upon a seemingly scientific,
numerical conclusion rather than to analyze
the evidence before it and decide where truth
lies. Probabilities cannot conclusively
establish that a single event did or did not
37

In the instant case, the prosecutor improperly asked
Appellant's jurors to reason that Appellant was guilty because
the exclusion of the another person with a possible motive to
start the fire made Appellant's guilt more probable .

The trial

court acted properly in excluding this evidence, and in
introducing it, the prosecutor called to the attention of the
21
jurors a matter which was not properly considered.
2. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THE JURORS WERE PROBABLY
INFLUENCED BY THOSE REMARKS.
In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 487 (Utah 1984), the
appellant was convicted of aggravated arson and insurance fraud
in a jury trial during which the prosecutor's conduct was
improper.

Id., at 485.

The prosecutor informed the jurors that

the appellant had gone by a different name in the past, that the
appellant was a witness under the protection of the federal
government, that the appellant had been represented in other
criminal proceedings.

Jd. at 485.

The prosecutor also compared

the appellant's behavior to that of John Hinckley, and asked the
jurors to consider their personal experiences in reaching their
occur and are particularly inappropriate when
used to establish facts "not susceptible to
quantitative analysis," such as whether a
particular individual is telling the truth at
any given time.
Id. at 501 (citations omitted).
21
See also State v. Sinclair, 389 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah
1964)(Court did not err in precluding question concerning whether
accomplice was also charged with the crime because "[o]rdinarily
whether someone else has been charged with the instant offense is
indeed immaterial to the issue to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant who is on trial. The issue of concern, here was not
[the accomplice's] guilt or innocence but the defendant's.").
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verdict*

I_d. at 485, 486*
After concluding that the prosecutor had called to the

attention of the jurors matters which were not properly to be
considered, this Court concluded that the prosecutor's
misconduct mandated a new trial.

jCcl. at 487•

The facts of the

case provided in the opinion indicate that Troy involved a fire
involving natural gas and accelerants ("probably gasoline") in a
dwelling owned by the appellant and his ex-wife.

The state

alleged that the appellant's motive was his desire to obtain
insurance proceeds because he was in financial straights.

The

appellant visited the burned home on the day of the fire, and a
large can of gasoline was found in his car.

Testimony indicated

that the appellant was working during the fire.

^Id. at 484.

While the comments made by the prosecutor in Troy
merely expressed the prosecutor's view that the appellant was a
person who had engaged in some unsavory activities in general,
the evidence introduced by the prosecutor in this case attempted
to demonstrate an increased probability that appellant started
the fire at issue in this case, by excluding another possible
suspect.

Thus, the evidence the prosecutor introduced in this

case had a more harmful impact than that in Troy.
The entirely circumstantial evidence against Appellant
in the instant case is weaker than that presented in Troy.
Review of the statement of facts indicates that the jurors could
have concluded that the fire was caused by a cigarette, by
accelerants in the apartment below Ms. Lee's, or by accelerants
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in the air conditioner or those inherent in the carpeting, by
the gas log, or by some combination of these things .

Appellant

was with his father at the time the fire began, and there was no
gas or other accelerant seen or found in Appellant's possession.
In these circumstances, it is appropriate for this Court to once
again conclude that the misconduct of the prosecutor calls for
reversal of Appellant's conviction because "there was not
compelling proof of defendant's guilt.
either way."

The jury could have found

Troy at 487.
III.
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION.

Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-103 defines aggravated
arson as follows;
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated
arson if by means of fire or explosives he
intentionally and unlawfully damagess
(a) a habitable structure; or
(b) any structure or vehicle when any
person not a participant in the offense is in
the structure or vehicle.
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the
first degree.
Appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence
that arson was committed, or that he committed it.

The standard

of review of such a claim of insufficiency of the evidence was
explained in State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983).
Court said:
In reviewing a claim of insufficient
evidence, this Court must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict
and will interfere only when the evidence is
so lacking and insubstantial that a
reasonable person could not possibly have
40

The

reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt*
Id. at 550.

If the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or

inherently improbable, this Court must reverse Appellant's
conviction.

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

Particularly after comparing the instant case with
other arson cases, this Court should conclude that there was no
conclusive evidence that the fire was caused by arson, or by
Appellant.
Fire investigators found no accelerant containers or
other modes of starting a fire in or near the apartment (T. 198).
Ms. Lee's apartment was full of natural fire hazards - it had
just been cleaned (T. 364) (cleaning agents contain hydrocarbons
(T. 120-122)), the gas log was on and tipped over (T. 171-172,
192), the carpeting was composed of hydrocarbons (T. 111-114,
117), and people were smoking cigarettes in the apartment on the
day of the fire (T. 366). Possible natural fire sources such as
the air conditioner (T. 192-193, 196), clothing on the floor (T.
199-200, 292), and apartment full of cleaning materials directly
below the burned apartment were not investigated for hydrocarbon
, 22
content (T. 198-199).
The State presented inconsistent testimony about

22
Compare State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 892 (Utah
1986)(evidence of arson sufficient; large drums of fire
accelerants were moved into the burned structure, and
intentionally poured); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah
1986)(evidence of arson sufficient; defendants had a large
quantity of acetone, a fire accelerant, in their home, and
acetone-soaked suitcases and a device for igniting the fire were
found in the home after the fire).
41

whether or not there were pour patterns in the apartment (T* 201202; 283), and the investigator pointing out what he considered
pour patterns testified that there was no conclusive proof that
the patterns were caused by someone intentionally pouring
flammable liquids (T. 284-285)e23
Ms. Lee testified that she was the only one with a full
set of keys to the apartment she left locked on the day of the
fire (T. 355, 363-364).

The windows to the apartment blew out

from the heat of the fire (as opposed to falling inward during a
break-in)(T. 100, 239), and the dead bolt and other lock to the
only door to the apartment were found in a locked position after
Mr. Van Os and Mr. Taylor pushed the door in during their rescue
efforts (T. 204, 138-139, 219). 2 4
There was no physical evidence that Appellant started
25
the fire in Ms. Lee8s apartment.
Appellant and his father
indicated that Appellant was at home with his father at the time
26
the fire started (T. 442-447).
Appellant had no keys to Ms.
23
Compare State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 892 (Utah
1986)(evidence of arson sufficient; pour patterns were linked
with trails of paper towels); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126
(Utah 1986)(evidence of arson sufficient; pour patterns and
"trailers" between them were found in the burned home).
24
Compare State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 892 (Utah
1986)(evidence of arson sufficient; back door to burned structure
was forced open).
25
Compare State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 892 (Utah
1986)(evidence of arson sufficient; defendant's prints found on
accelerant container outside burned structure) .
26
Compare State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah
1984)(evidence of arson inconclusive; defendant was at work when
the fire started); State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 893 (Utah
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Lee's apartment (T. 355, 363-364)

and was not seen with any

fire accelerants (T. 4 4 7 ) . 2 8
The conversation between Appellant and Karen Bateman on
the night of the fire was unclear.

Appellant either told Ms..

Bateman that Ms. Lee• s apartment was in flames or that he flamed
Ms. Lee's apartment (T. 394-395, 426). While the clarification
of that statement was crucial to the prosecution, the
clarification was impossible because Ms. Bateman was drunk when
Appellant came over at approximately 3s30 a.m. on the night of
the fire (T. 395, 399), and because Ms. Bateman was interviewed
by the fire investigator on the morning of the fire, while her
friend, the victim, Ms. Lee, was present and repeatedly
29
interrupting the interview (T. 427-428, 430).
Particularly in
light of the physical evidence in this case, which indicates that
Appellant had no mode of access to Ms. Lee's apartment, and which
1986)(evidence of arson sufficient; defendant's alibi, even if
true, did not preclude the possibility that he started the fire).
27
Compare State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah
1984)(evidence of arson inconclusive - defendant maintained the
burned home, and was inside it almost daily and on the day of the
fire); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah 1986)(defendants
burned their own home, to which they had access).
28
Compare State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah
1984)(evidence of arson inconclusive; defendant in possession of
large can of gasoline, the probable fire accelerant used in the
fire); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah 1986)(defendant
told her neighbor she had acetone, a fire accelerant, by the
barrelful).
29
Compare State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 893 (Utah
1986)(evidence of arson sufficient; modus operandi of starting
fire fit description of what defendant told his co-worker he
would do if he were fired).
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does not prove that the fire was caused by arson, the Court
should not allow Appellant's conviction to stand on one of Ms*
Bateman8s two versions of what Appellant said on the night of the
fire*
Because the State failed to present proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the fire in Ms. Lee's apartment was caused
by arson, or specifically by Appellant, Appellant's conviction
should be reversed and this Court should declare him innocent as
a matter of law*

State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 403 (Utah 1980).
CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse Appellant's conviction and
bar his retrial.

In the event that this Court finds that there

was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, this Court
should reverse Appellant's conviction on either or both of the
grounds articulated in Points I and II, and remand this case for
a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this * ^ day of Sepfonio^/O
1989.
BROOKE C. WEL
Attorney for Appei:
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the Court's

I

forth.

that
And

and

when

I chose

suggestive

for the Court

a matter

I don't
fashion, and

of maybe

one

of the challenge

attention

are being
and

observes

exercised,
then one by

the fourth one
QUASH

was

to it.

simply

of prospective

67

or to

time.

respect,

The Court

list

else

But I

at that

the exercise

one by the prosecutor
Then

And

in an untimely

it was only

be

the

this type of hearing

appropriate

as the preemptories

and

awkward

those challenges

THE C O U R T :

22

it would

to this fact until

the jury selection

17

by Mr*

attention, or anyone

have been

to have

So with
that

I felt that

any jurors were sworn*

exercised

in

juror was his

had been completed*

it would

the

raised,

The striking

prospective

attention

himself

to the timely

very quickly*

to call the Court's

10

member

that

behalf*

If I may respond

5

indicate

they
the

jurors

goes

is struck

JURY

are

by

1

the p r o s e c u t o r ,

it comes back

2

still one more

3

while you

4

that

5

and

6

have had

7

counsel

ask

8

inquire

as to the reasons

to t a k e .

And

are selecting

your

that's been d o n e .

that

issue

raised

to approach

burdens being

il

for d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .

12

claim

and

time

it back

each one.

I

have had
ask

the Court

to

it.

case did

talk

and

about

the

to show some

Does the defendant
of a cognizable

THE DEFENDANT?

basis

in this

racial

case

group?

I don't know what

that

is o

15

MS. WELLS:

He is a member

16

race, your H o n o r .

17

need not himself be a member

19

order

19

minority member

20

stated.

However,

to have standing

21

for

of a minority

the reasons

is excused,

°PPortunity

to pursue

that

and outside

the hearing

that

race

I've

of a

else?

at the time before

the

it gives

an

issue, do

the Court

it in

QUASH

JURY

he

in

already

chambers

of the p a n e l , and go
68

white

the striking

that

Anything

If it is raised
rest of the panel

of the

it is our position

to challenge

THE C O U R T :

22

as

observe

one to

b e f o r e , and

upon defendant,

that he is part

13

24

fourth

the bench

The Badson

10

21

that

the bailiff passes

for

with

so you've got

forth each time so that you can check

9

H

And

to defense counsel

through

.

b e f o r e t h e - - you have t o s t a r t

over s e l e c t i n g

a

1
3

new j u r y .
So principally on the basis of

J
4
S
C
?

timeliness, as well as I think the burdens seem to be
indicated to be upon the defendant to show that he is
of a recognizable minority group, the Court concludes
that the motion ought to be denied.
(In open court.)

8

THE COURT:

9

Would you stand and raise

your right hand?

10

(Jury sworn & Preliminary Instructions Read)

11

MS. WELLS:

12

Your Honor, I would at this

13

time invoke the Exclusionary Rule as to all the

14

potential witnesses, and ask the Court to admonish

15

them as to the meaning of that rule.

16

MR. BOWN:

17

I have four witnesses here,

who are witnesses.

18

THE COURT:

19

Would you all come forward

and be sworn?

20

(Prospective Witnesses Sworn.)

21

THE COURT:

22

hall, and remain until you are called.

23

talk to each other about the case.

24

permit anybody else to talk to you about the case.

25

someone approaches you and tries to talk about the
I

You are all to go out in the
You are not to

You are not to
If

APPENDIX 2

MS. WELLS:

All right.

Thank

you.

THE COURT?

May this witness be

excused?
MR. BOWN:

I would

THE C O O R T :

so m o v e .

You may be excused.

Thank

yOU •

You may call your

next

witness.

Gft-ftKFP-frOB-S-ew, called
witness on behalf
10 | sworn, testified

of the State, after
as

having

as a

been

duly

follows:
DI-REC? - -BX-ft-Mi-NA-TIO-N

i:
12| BY MR C

BOWNs
Q.

Would

you

state your

A.

Grant

Hodson.

Q.

Spell your

A.

H-o-d-s-o-n.

Q.

And do you have any

last

Y e s , I'm

Q.

You

A.

I'm buying

own

from Don Christiansen,
*ith Deseret

the
the

please?

name.

the address of 2800 South Adams
A.

name,

relationship

in South

Salt

with
Lake?

landlord.
building?

it from Construction

who,

Realty

in turn, has a mortgage

Federal.

Q.

How long

A.

Three

have you been buying

that?

years.
411
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WIT ST

D

Qe

What kind

A.

It's a l i t t l e over

twenty-four

units.

Q»
occupancy

Itfs

just prior

40 p e r c e n t

old,

fire?

very good b e f o r e or after

It was worse after

55, 60 p e r c e n t

ten y e a r s

of 1988 -- what was your

to the

It w a s n ' t

is it?

attractive*

In November

A.
fire.

of a b u i l d i n g

the f i r e .

o c c u p a n c y prior

But

the

it was

about

to the f i r e , and

about

after.

10I

Itfs

M S . WELLS?

Objection

12

THE C O U R T ?

Sustained,

13

MR. BOWNs

14

As a r e s u l t of the -- are you aware of a

11

not relevant ®

15

fire at that b u i l d i n g

16

November?
A .

Y e s , I am.

18I

Q.

What kind

condition

Well —

on or about

17 I

19

to a f t e r .

okay.

the 16th of

of r e p a i r s were done --

is that b u i l d i n g

in

today?

20

MS. WELLS:

Objection,

2

THE C O U R T :

Whatfs

1 I

22

M R . BOWN:

23

attempting

24

a suspect

25

to do

Your

what

relevancy.

the r e l e v a n c e of it?

H o n o r , I'm -- what

I'm

to do is show that one p e r s o n who might be
in the f i r e , this g e n t l e m a n ,

had no

reason

that.
412
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D

MS* WELLSs
MR. BOWNs

We are not -Had no reason to fire -- to

«tart a fire in his own apartment? although, he could
be

a suspect.
Well, I f m certainly not

MS. WELLSs
claiming that, or wouldn f t
questions*

intend on asking such

The relevancy as to the condition now,

though, still is objectionable.
THE COORTs
MR. BOWNs

Sustained.
Did you sustain any losses as

a result of the fire?
MS. WELLSs

I will object to that, as

THE COURTi

Sustained.

well.

MR. BOWNs

May we approach the bench,

your Honor?
THE CODRTs

You may.
(Discussion off the record.)

MR. BOWNs

Mr. Hodson, when did you

first learn about the fire at your building?
A.

At 5s00 a.m. on -- I think it was the

morning of the 16th.

It was the day of the fire, 15th

or 16th of November.

The manager gave me a call on

the phone that morning.
Q.
I

Have you suffered as a result of that
413

HODSON

WIT ST

D

ot

t<

u
n
13
14

that

A.

E x c u s e me,

what?

Q.

Yes or n o ,

h a v e you s u f f e r e d

as

a

result

fire?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you start that fire?

A.

No.

stricken.

MS. WELLS:

Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

You are to disregard
MS. WELLS:
MR. BOWN:
MS. WELLS:

It may be

it.

And your Honor -I have no further questions.
-- I think I need to make a

motion outside the presence of the jury.

IS

THE COURT:

U

We will be recess for five minutes.

17

The jury is admonished

18

each other, not to talk to anyone, not to form or

19

express any opinions.

20

You may.

not to talk to

We will meet counsel in chambers.

21

(Recess)

22

(In chambers)

23

MS. WELLS:

Your Honor, defense would

24

move for a mistrial.

25

question asked by the prosecutor, we approached

Immediately before the last
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the

^h at the d e f e n s e ' s

i

request

MR. BOWN:

i

At my

M S . WELLSs

-request*

I am sorry*

I think

it was

i
gine*
#

MR. BOWN:

It was mine*

MS. WELLS:

But either

THE C O U R T :

At the prosecutor's

MS. WELLS:

Either

side bar off the record
t| j the relevancy
ji

the landlord,

12

the case.

of asking

that

J) concerning

whether

14

particular

loss

15

he would

have as a

that it would

**

any further beyond

l»

suffer

be

to

of M r . Hodson,

questions

have suffered

fire beyond

in

any

the obvious, that

landlord.

I believe

n\

at

him as a suspect

to any

or not he would

in this

request.

I was objecting

eliminate

I also objected

—

way, a conference

any questions

that would

And

U

was

way

that

improper

the Court agreed

with me,

for the prosecution

the general question

to go

of, "Did

you

a loss?"

20

Counsel's

21

"Did you start

22

responded,

immediate

the f i r e ? " , to which

"No."

That

response were clearly
*t the bench, and
the prosecution

next

question
contrary

serve

and

the

elicited
ruling

this defendant

to eliminate other
415

was,

the witness

to the Court's

to prejudice

attempted

question

as

possible

MISTRIAL

suspects•
I further
no intention

of

responsible*

and w a s n f t

I believe

indicated

indicating

Court's order

and

asked

the landlord

intending

the prosecutor

at the bench

in any way

to argue

went directly
an ultimate

I had

that*

against

and

was
And

the

improper

7 I ques t ion •
3
9

MR, BOWNi

Each

theft or a crime where more
committed

it, I submit

11

routinely

about

it is relevant*

12

And I think

13

any -- the Court

sustaining

14

see that

any prejudice

-- with p e o p l e ,

that's -- that

there's

If they

every

"Did

And

is relevant*

to the
that

-- I assume,

17

enter

18

jury finds that

19

set that.

20

defendant

21

the only way that

22

if there's a p o s s i b i l i t y ,

a likelihood,

23

doubt based

that

2

*

fire.

2

5

it was an arson,

It has to be a p e r s o n .
to say, "Well, there's

And

if*

that

see

I can't

reasonable doubt

-- that

it?"

defendant.

reasonable doubt,

I

the only way

can

in fact,

the

someone had

And

for

a reasonable

very

frankly,
416

someone

to

the
doubt

there can be a reasonable doubt

the fact

have
asked

I can't

the objection*

are arguing

into it is if someone

it's

you commit

16

upon

time there's a

than one person could

10

15

and

is

a reasonable
else set

as I analyze

the

MISTRIAL

that

IV

1
I
3

4

facts,

the persons

attached
fraud

are the

who a r e - -

landlord,

in a f i r e ,

set

fire

t o whom b l a m e can be

with p o t e n t i a l
of

an a p a r t m e n t ;

insurance
Barbara

Lee, it's her apartment and the defendant? or someone

c clear out of the blue*

I'm attempting

to eliminate

(

the doubt that would enter into if that evidence is

7

not involved

g

in the c a s e .
M S . WELLS:

9 I issue.

The Court made a ruling at the bench, and

10

counsel disregarded

11

question, anyway.

12
13
14

Your Honor, that's not the

the Court's ruling, and asked the

THE COURT:

The Court will deny the

motion for m i s t r i a l .
It's relevant, but my conclusion was

15

that he wasn't charged, he wasn't a suspect and there

16

wasn't anything

17

thought it unnecessary, and so indicated that I didn't

18

think it was appropriate under the c i r c u m s t a n c e s .

19

in the record to suggest it. And I

I granted the -- sustained the

20

objection, admonished the jury -- indicated

21

stricken, and admonished

22

upon that, I'll deny the motion for a mistrial.

23

M S . WELLS:

it was

them to ignore it. And based

I would ask counsel to

24

indicate if he intends to ask -- he did not ask that

25

question of Barbara L e e .
417
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jl

MR, BOWNs

That's true,

I didn s t

think

2

about that issue until this morning as I was doing my

3

closing.

4
5

MS. WELLSs

Is there any attempt to

elicit that information from anybody else?

6

MR. BOWNj

I think as far as with

7

Barbara Lee, the evidence is clear that she was

8

elsewhere with someone else, someone who said she was

9

elsewhere.

10
11

MS. WELLSs

Well, I would ask a -- that

the Court order that no further --

12

MR. BOWN:

I have no further

questions

13

of him, and that's essentially the end of my case.

14

soon as there's cross-examination,

15

MS. WELLSs

As

it will be over.

Because we have a record and

16

side-bar conferences are not placed on the record,

17

would the Court clarify that you did, in fact, make a

18

ruling that that solicitation of testimony was

19

irrelevant and that the objection was sustained?

20

THE COURT:

Under the circumstances, it

21

was appropriate since the landlord hadn't been

22

charged, and there may be any number of people that

23

might be suspects.

24

didn't think

25

indicated

And under the circumstances, I

it was material to the case, and so

that would be my ruling.
418
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«

MR. BOWNs

I apologize, your Honor,

It

2

was -- in my mind, that question was not precluded.

3

It was -- you know, I can't tell you the process that

I

I went through*

5

thought it was -- it was not precluded by the side

6

bar.

7

But as I asked the question, I

THE COURT:

There was an earlier

8 I reservation of an exception.
9

If that's convenient, we

will make that on the record.

10

MS. WELLS;

It was my renewed motion in

11

limine, where Ms. Bateman was not able to indicate

12

when or where -- when, particularly, the conversation

13

took place about alleged bombing of a car, and that

14

that would have been outside the Court's earlier

15

ruling with regard to what the prosecutor could go

16

into •

17

THE COURT:

The Court overruled the

18

objection.

19

that there was a statement against interest about

20

flaming her house, or apartment, and her statements

21

were inconsistent, apparently, with the statements

22

which she made to the fire investigator.

23

the prosecutor was -- it was apparent he was caught by

24

surprise, I allowed him to pursue those subjects.

25

The information the Court had earlier was

MR. BOWN:
I

And because

And I still do have a witness
419
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ADDENDUM

United States Constitution, Amendment 6
In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel
for his defence.
United States Constitution, Amendment 14 section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Utah Constitution Article I section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Utah Constitution Article I section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right ... to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to
have been committed.
Utah Constitution Article I section 24
All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.

Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-103
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated

arson if by means of fire or explosives he
intentionally and unlawfully damages:
(a) a habitable structure; or
(b) any structure or vehicle
when any person not a participant
in the offense is in the structure
or vehicle.
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the
first degree.
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-2
It is the policy of this state that
persons selected for jury service be selected
at random from a fair cross section of the
population of the area served by the court,
and that all qualified citizens have the
opportunity in accordance with this act to be
considered for jury service and have the
obligation to serve as jurors when summoned
for that purpose.
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-3
A citizen shall not be excluded or
exempt from jury service on account of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or
economic status.
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-16
(1) Within seven days after the moving
party discovered, or by the exercise of
diligence could have discovered the grounds
therefore, and in any event before the trial
jury is sworn to try the case, a party may
move to stay the proceedings or to quash an
indictment, or for other appropriate relief,
on the ground of substantial failure to
comply with this act in selecting a grand or
trial jury.
(2) Upon motion filed under this section
containing a sworn statement of acts which if
true would constitute a substantial failure
to comply with this act, the moving party may
present testimony of the county clerk, the
clerk of the court, any relevant records and
papers not public or otherwise available
used by the jury commission or the clerk, and
any other relevant evidence. If the court
determines that in selecting either a grand

or a trial jury there has been a substantial
failure to comply with this act and it
appears that actual and substantial injustice
and prejudice has resulted or will result to
a party in consequence of the failure, the
court shall stay the proceedings pending the
selection of the jury in conformity with this
act, quash an indictment, or grant other
appropriate relief.
(3) The procedures prescribed by this
section are the exclusive means by which a
person accused of a crime, the state, or a
party in a civil case may challenge a jury on
the ground that the jury was not selected in
conformity with this act.
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4
A lawyer shall not ... (c) Knowingly disobey
an obligation under the rules of a tribunal
except for an open refusal based on an
assertion that no valid obligation exists;...
(e) In trial, allude to any matter that the
lawyer does not reasonably believe is
relevant or that will not be supported by
admissible evidence,...".
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a
minister of justice and not simply that of an
advocate.
Utah Rule of Evidence 403
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.nd
discretion of the trial court.

